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Abstract 
This paper develops a three-step empirical methodology to test the rational electoral-
cycle hypothesis. The first step consists of testing for the existence of electoral cycles in 
fiscal policy. The second step conducts three tests for how such cycles should depend on 
election outcomes as suggested by recent political agency models. The third step is to 
regress electoral success on fiscal policy. This three-step approach is applied to a panel of 
Swedish  local  governments  with  more  than  2000  observations  from  elections.  The 
findings are as follows: (i) spending is raised and taxes are cut in the election year, (ii) in 
the election year, spending is higher for a government that will be re-elected as compared 
to those that will not be re-appointed, (iii) in the post-election year, spending is higher 
and  taxes  are  lower  for  re-elected  governments  than  for  newly  elected  ones,  (iv)  re-
elected governments spend less and tax more in the post-election year as compared to the 
election year, (v) conditional on taxes, spending is positively related to electoral success. 
These set of findings are consistent with Rogoff’s equilibrium budget cycle model where 
a government signals its competence through cycles in fiscal policy. 
 
JEL classification: C5, E6, H0, H1, H3, H7, P16 
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1. Introduction 
The  electoral-cycle  models  by  Nordhaus  (1975)  and  Lindbeck  (1976)  predict  that 
politicians  should  manipulate  economic  policy  just  before  elections  to  increase  their 
chances of re-election. While politicians are frequently characterized as driven by such 
office-seeking  motives,  surprisingly  little  systematic  evidence  supports  the  electoral-
cycle hypothesis.
1 In recent years, however, some studies claim to find support for an 
electoral cycle in fiscal policy.
2 These findings then raise the deeper question of why 
such  policy  cycles  should  help  politicians  to  get  re-elected.  The  early  literature 
sidestepped this issue by assuming that voters had inconsistent or irrational expectations.  
The recent political agency literature proposes explanations of electoral cycles 
based on voter rationality. At the heart of this literature is the conflict of interest between 
citizens  and  politicians  and  the  main  incentive  mechanism  available  to  discipline 
politicians  is  through  the  act  of  voting.  Rational  but  uninformed  voters  reward  good 
performance in office with their vote, because they attribute good performance either to 
competence of the politician or to restraint in the use of political power. In other words, 
election is a mechanism for curbing moral hazard problems and to sort in politicians with 
desirable  characteristics.  That  voter’s  appraise  their  politicians  by  using  such  a 
retrospective  voting  scheme  suggests  that  the  incentives  for  a  politician  to  appear 
competent and to perform well are stronger just ahead of elections.  
While the models by Lindbeck and Nordhaus predict electoral cycles in fiscal 
policy before elections, the political agency models offer much sharper predictions about 
how such cycles should vary with electoral outcomes. There are basically two different 
classes of political agency models as represented by Rogoff (1990) and Besley and Case 
(1995) and Banks and Sundaram (1998). Rogoff emphasizes reputation building by office 
seeking  politicians,  whereas  Besley  and  Case/Banks  and  Sundaram  stress  electoral 
accountability of rent-seeking politicians. This difference in politicians’ motivations has 
                                                 
1 For example, Alt and Crystal (1983) in their review of the state of the literature 20 years ago conclude,
1 
“No  one  could  read  the  political  business  literature  without  being  struck  by  the  lack  of  supporting 
evidence.” See Drazen (2001) for a recent review. 
2 The recent studies are: Alesina et al. (1997) with data from OECD countries, Blais and Nadeau (1992) 
and Reid (1998) with data from Canadian Provisional governments, and Bizer and Durlauf (1990) with data 
from the US. Shi and Svensson (2002) also find evidence of opportunistic manipulation of fiscal policy 
instruments using a cross-country data set from both developed and developing countries.    2
implications for the predictions about the fiscal behavior of politicians. While both types 
of models have the same prediction about taxes, i.e., good politicians are associated with 
lower taxes, their prediction for spending differs. In Rogoff’s model higher spending is 
associated with good politicians, while the opposite is true in Besley and Case/Banks and 
Sundaram’s set-ups.  
The predictions from the agency models can be tested by comparing the fiscal 
choices of politicians across four possible states of the world: election year about to win, 
election year about to lose, post-election year re-appointed and post-election year newly 
elected. One test is that fiscal behavior of politicians in the election year should differ 
depending on whether they will be re-elected or not in the upcoming election. This test 
has to do with voters adopting a “cut-off” rule (i.e., rational retrospective voting) under 
which politicians are re-elected only when policy outcomes exceed a critical bound and 
good politicians’ being able to separate themselves from bad ones. A second test is that 
the fiscal behavior of policymakers in their post-election year should differ depending on 
whether they have been re-elected or are newly elected, which is due to a selection effect: 
only good politicians get re-elected while only some of the newly elected politicians are 
good. A third test is that the post-election year fiscal behavior of re-elected politicians 
should  differ  from  their  election  year  behavior,  which  is  based  on  that  re-election 
incentives are stronger just ahead of elections than afterwards.
3  
To the best of my knowledge, only two studies have empirically explored any of 
these tests. Bizer and Durlauf (1990) show that taxes are reduced two  years prior to 
successful presidential re-election attempts, and Besley and Case (1995) present evidence 
that Democratic governors change their fiscal behavior when they are in their second 
term and face a binding term limit as compared to their first term in office. Hence, Bizer 
and Durlauf shed light on the first test,
4 whereas Besley and Case perform the third test 
since they compare the fiscal choices of an incumbent politician when she faces a re-
election incentive versus when she does not. Despite that these studies have provided 
some useful information about the practical relevance of political agency models, our 
                                                 
3 Although, politicians may serve for a number of periods and may therefore care for their reputation, it is 
reasonable to think that the strength of the re-election incentive should vary with the time left to the next 
election. 
4 Bizer and Durlauf do not directly perform the first test since they do not make an explicit comparison with 
unsuccessful presidential re-election attempts.   3
knowledge of the real world relevance of the rational electoral-cycle hypothesis is still 
quite limited.   
The contribution of this paper is to fill this lacuna by using a three-step empirical 
methodology applied to an attractive data set from Swedish local governments with 2259 
observations from election periods. In the first step, I will test for an election year effect 
in fiscal policy. In the second step, I will perform the tests derived from the political 
agency literature as discussed above. In the third step, I will regress electoral success on 
fiscal policy. The benefit of using this three-step methodology is that we are able to get a 
coherent picture of all working parts of the rational electoral-cycle hypothesis. 
There are some other attractive features of using Swedish local governments as a 
testing  ground  other  than  the  very  large  number  of  observations  from  elections. 
Importantly, the source of variation used for identifying an electoral cycle in fiscal policy 
comes  from  an  exogenously  fixed  election  schedule,  which  avoids  any  endogeneity 
problems
5  associated  with  that  incumbents  may  strategically  choose  when  to  call  an 
election:
6 Elections are always held on the third Sunday of September every fourth year.
7 
Another attractive feature is that the fiscal year is the same as the calendar year, which 
avoids bias due to that the fiscal policy variables is not synchronized with the election 
cycle.
8 Swedish local governments also have the constitutional right of self-government, 
                                                 
5 One might argue here that the estimate of the electoral effect in the case that the incumbent can call an 
early election would be biased downwards since it is typically assumed that an incumbent is only going to 
call an early election when the economy is booming. However, this statement is only going to be true if 
fiscal policies are counter cyclical and if the only reason for calling early elections is due to the state of the 
economy.  Lane  (2002),  for  example,  finds  empirical  evidence  of  both  pro  and  counter  cyclical  fiscal 
policies, which makes it hard to predict the overall sign of the bias. More generally, the direction of the bias 
is quite difficult to assess under less restrictive assumptions about the reason to call an early election and 
the correlation between the omitted variables and the policy outcome of interest. Moreover, one must use 
an instrumental variable approach if elections and policy outcomes are determined simultaneously in order 
to get consistent estimates. The bottom line of the above discussion is that we need to understand the source 
of variation used to estimate the parameter of interest in order to make causal inference, a general line of 
argument that has been forcefully emphasized by labor economists in the natural experiment approach, as 
discussed by Angrist and Kreuger (1999). 
6 Among the OECD countries, for example, it is only in Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.S. the 
incumbent government is unable to call an early election. Among the other OECD countries with flexible 
election calendars, 44 percent of all elections during the period 1961 to 1988 were held at least one year 
before the current government’s term was due to expire and 53 percent at least six months early (Mackie 
and Rose 1991) thus making the calling of an early election a quite prevalent feature. 
7 Elections used to be held every third year, but as from 1994 elections are held every fourth year. 
8 The work on cross-country  data, for example, face this problem when having to define the election 
indicator depending on whether the election is held early or late during the election year.   4
they  have  no  restriction  on  borrowing,  and  they  have  no  balanced  budget  rules.
9 
Moreover, only 20 percent of their revenues are from grants, whereas the bulk comes 
from a proportional income tax, which each municipality can set freely.
10 In other words, 
they have a large degree of freedom in fiscal policy, which has resulted in quite large 
differences  in  policy  outcomes  across  local  governments.  Finally,  Swedish  local 
governments also play a significant role in the Swedish Economy. During the sample 
period their total spending amounted to 20-25 percent of GDP and they employed 20-25 
percent of the total Swedish workforce. This makes them more economically significant 
than most other sub-national governments around the world. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents two 
classes of political agency models and their implications for how electoral cycles in fiscal 
policy  depend  on  election  outcomes.  Section  3,  develops  the  three-step  empirical 
methodology  used  for  testing  the  rational  electoral-cycle  hypothesis,  while  section  4 
describes the data from Swedish local governments. Section 5 presents the results and 
section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
9 As from 2000, there exists a balanced budget rule.  
10 From 1991 to 1993, however, the central government imposed a temporary tax cap.   5
2. Rational electoral-cycle models  
In this section, I present and discuss two classes of political agency models as represented 
by Rogoff (1990), Besley and Case (1995), and Banks and Sundaram (1998). Rogoff’s 
model  emphasizes  reputation  building  by  office  seeking  politicians  while  Besley  and 
Case/Banks  and  Sundaram’s  models  stress  electoral  accountability  of  rent-seeking 
politicians.  These  differences  will  have  implications  for  the  predictions  about  fiscal 
policy as discussed below. 
Rogoff’s model  
In Rogoff’s model an incumbent politician must choose levels of public goods, taxes and 
public investment. The level of public investment is observable with a lag while taxes 
and public goods are observable immediately. Elections take place every other period, but 
in  each  period,  there  is  a  shock  to  competence  observed  only  by  the  incumbent. 
Politicians  differ  in  their  competence  where  high  competence  means  that  they  can 
produce a higher level of public spending for a given level of taxes. Competence evolves 
according  to  a  MA(1)  process,  which  implies  that  competence  in  any  given  period 
contains both a contemporary portion and the realization of the preceding period. The 
value of the competence shock becomes known to voters with a one period lag. Thus, 
when an election comes, voters observe the off-election year competence shock but not 
the election year value. Rogoff assumes that politicians have the same utility function as 
voters but they also get some independent level of utility from holding office, i.e., ego 
rents.  
This set up implies that competent politicians would like to reveal to voters that 
they are competent since they care about voters’ welfare. The competent incumbent will 
signal her competence just before elections by boosting spending and cutting taxes. A 
competent policymaker is able to do this since it is less costly for her to cut back on 
public investment in order to finance a given level of public spending (holding taxes 
fixed).  In  Rogoff’s  model,  competent  politicians  are  therefore  responsible  for  the 
electoral cycle in spending and taxes. If there were no re-election possible, then no cycle 
would occur. Thus, Rogoff’s model has implications for fiscal policy choices conditional 
on election outcomes as follows:   6
PRE-ELECTION PREDICTION: In the election year, voters re-elect those politicians 
that provide higher level of public good spending and a lower level of taxes since this 
is a signal of high competence. 
POST-ELECTION PREDICTION: After the election, re-elected politicians provide 
higher level of public good spending and lower levels of taxes than untried politicians 
because they are on average more competent 
PREPOST-ELECTION PREDICTION: After the election, re-elected politicians cut 
back on the level of public spending and increase taxes as compared to their election 
year level since the re-election incentive is weaker (i.e., no need to signal)  
Besley and Case/Banks and Sundaram’s model 
The agency models by Besley and Case (1995) and Banks and Sundaram (1998) do not 
explicitly model the public finance problem, but their models could be extended to such 
an analysis where good politicians do less of rent-seeking than bad ones.
11 In fact, the 
emphasize  of  the  role  of  elections  as  a  mean  to  curb  rent-seeking  is  an  implicit 
assumption  of  Besley  and  Case  analysis,  and  which  will  affect  the  implications  for 
electoral cycles in spending since higher levels of public spending will be associated with 
bad politicians, in contrast to the prediction from Rogoff’s model.  
Besley  and  Case’s  model  is  basically  a  stripped  down  version  of  Banks  and 
Sundaram’s model where politicians only can stay in office for two periods, which can be 
interpreted as model of repeated elections with the presence of term limits or that the 
second  period  represents  an  off-election  year  when  the  re-election  incentive  is  not 
effective, as in Rogoff’s model.
12 These models assume that politicians differ in their 
types and that there actions (i.e., amount of rent diversion) are unobserved; assumptions 
they also have in common with Rogoff’s set up. It is also assumed that voters make 
inference based on an observed payoff, which depends on the action the politician takes, 
and use this information to update their assessment of her type. Actions preferably to 
voters  are  associated  with  higher  costs  for  the  politician.  Incumbents  who  displease 
voters by extracting excessive rents are removed from office. In other words, voters use a 
                                                 
11 See Besley (2003) for such an extension. 
12  Rogoff  assumes  that  competence  follows  an  MA(1)  process    which  implies  that  competence  is 
uncorrelated across electoral cycles and therefore the incumbent re-election incentive is not effective in off 
election periods.    7
retrospective  voting  scheme  and  reappoint  the  incumbent  only  when  the  reward  she 
generates exceeds a critical bound. This type of rational retrospective voting rule is a 
feature  of  the  Rogoff’s  model  as  well.  Banks  and  Sundaram  show  that  there  exist 
equilibria which posses  the following properties: politicians’ strategies  are ordered in 
type in the sense that better politicians take higher actions and that voters use a cut-off 
rule where politicians are re-elected only if the election period reward exceeds a critical 
amount (i.e., Proposition 3.1 in Banks and Sundaram), politicians of each given type take 
higher actions in the election year than off-election years (i.e., Propositions 3.2 and 3.3), 
and re-elected politicians work harder than newly elected politicians (i.e., Proposition 
3.4). If we now make the assumption that higher types of politicians extract less rent than 
lower types, we will get the following predictions about electoral-cycles in fiscal policy 
and electoral outcomes from the Besley and Case/Banks and Sundaram type of models: 
 
PRE-ELECTION  PREDICTION:  In  the  election  year,  a  politician  that  increase 
spending  and  raise  taxes  is  not  re-elected  since  voters’  associate  higher  levels  of 
spending and taxes with more rent extraction.   
POST-ELECTION PREDICTION: After the election, re-elected politicians do less 
rent-seeking than untried politicians since they are on average better. Hence, spending 
and taxes are lower for re-elected politicians than newly elected ones. 
PREPOST-ELECTION  PREDICTION:  After  the  election,  re-elected  politician 
extract  more  rents  as  compared  to  their  pre-election  level  since  the  re-election 
incentives are weaker. Thus, re-elected politician increase spending and taxes in the 
post-election year as compared her pre-election level. 
 
Test of rational-electoral cycle models 
To test the predictions from the agency models we need to compare politicians’ choice of 
fiscal policy across four possible states of the world: election year about to win, election 
year about to lose, post-election year re-appointed and post-election year newly elected. 
Table 1 show the definition of four indicator variables each representing one of these four 
states of the world. With these indicators we can test the implications from both agency 
models by performing three different tests. These tests are displayed in Table 2, where   8
PRE-ELECTION is a test whether the policy choices of politicians in the election year 
differs depending on whether they will be re-elected or not in the upcoming election, 
POST-ELECTION is a test whether the policy choices in the post-election year differ 
depending on whether the politicians have been re-elected or if they are newly elected, 
and  PREPOST-ELECTION  is  a  test  whether  the  fiscal  policy  choices  of  re-elected 
politicians  differ  in  the  post-election  year  as  compared  to  the  election  year.  The 
predictions from the agency models and how they relates to these three tests are presented 
in Table 3, which reveals that the predictions from the two types of agency models about 
fiscal policy choices only differs for public spending.  
3. A three-step empirical methodology 
As discussed in the introduction, a three-step empirical methodology will be used to shed 
light on all working parts of the rational electoral-cycle hypothesis. The first step is to test 
for electoral effects in policy. The second step is to test the more specific predictions 
about fiscal policy choices and electoral outcomes as suggested by the political agency 
models in the previous section. The third step is to regress electoral success on policy. 
Step 1 
To test for electoral effects in fiscal policy, I will estimate regressions of the following 
types  
(1)   Pit = mi + dELEit + gPi,t-1 + Xitq + eit   
(2)    DPit =m + pELEit+ DXit
￿
 + uit   
where i indexes municipalities and t index time since we are using a panel of Swedish 
local governments. Pit is total spending or a proportional income tax rate (see section 4 
below), ELEit is an election year indicator variable defined as 1 if an election year and 
zero otherwise, Xit is a set of control variables and mi is a fixed municipality fixed effect. 
The parameters of interest are d and p since they measure the election effect.  
Equation (1) is a dynamic specification with a lagged dependent variable as used 
by many previous studies in the political business cycle literature, but it also includes 
fixed municipality fixed effect to take into account any unobserved heterogeneity across 
municipalities. The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable together with fixed effects 
can create  potential  estimation  problems,  but  considering  the  rather  long  time  period   9
(T=25)  the  potential  bias  of  using  a  fixed-effect  (FE)  estimator  is  probably  small.
13 
Nevertheless, I will use an alternative instrumental variable estimator as developed by 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) that may be more attractive in a dynamic panel data context 
with a small T. This estimator is constructed by first differencing equation (1), i.e., DPit = 
dDELEit + gDPi,t-1 + DXitq + Deit, and then applying an instrumental variable method 
using DPi,t-2 as an instrument for DPi,t-1. 
An alternative way of specifying a dynamic model is via the error term rather than 
using a lagged dependent variable. This is the method used to estimate equation 2. With 
the exception of the election indicator variable, all the variables are first-differenced.
14 
The reason for not first-differencing the election indicator variable is that it would imply 
a model where all election increases in policy outcomes are completely undone in the 
following  year.  This  also  means  that  we  put  less  structure  on  the  data  for  the 
identification of the election effect. To deal with serial correlation of the errors, I will 
follow the approach suggested by Betrand et al. (2004) and Kezdi (2002) to cluster the 
standard errors at the municipality level.  
A  final  specification  issue  concerns  how  to  control  for  time  effects.  Since 
Swedish local governments have a synchronized fixed election date it is impossible to 
include a full set of time effects. However, I will include a full set of election period 
effects instead. Hence, the election effect will only be identified from the variation within 
election periods. In addition, fixed municipality  effects will be added to equation (2) 
thereby allowing for different growth rates in policy outcomes.  
Step 2 
This sub-section tests the more specific predictions for policy choices as derived from the 
political agency models in section 2. According to implication from these agency models, 
there  are  three  tests  to  be  made.  These  tests  are  displayed  in  Table  2,  while  their 
corresponding predictions across the two types of agency models are presented in Table 
3. We can now estimate regression equations of the form  
(3)   DPit = a0+ a1Ait+ a2Bit +a3Cit + DXit
￿
 + uit   
                                                 
13 See Wooldridge (2002) for a very good textbook treatment about this subject. 
14 This specification is used by Levitt (1997) in his empirical analysis of electoral cycles in police hiring.   10
where the definition of the indicator variables Ait, Bit, and Cit are given in Table 1. With 
equation (3) we are able to conduct all three tests.
15 For example, the estimate of a3 
would correspond to the POST-ELECTION test.  
The empirical analysis will be restricted to the election year and the post-election 
year since these are the years when the difference in electoral incentives will be most 
marked. In equation (3), election-period effects will be controlled for, as in equations (1) 
and (2), as well as allowing for different growth rates in policy outcomes by including 
fixed municipality effect.  
Step 3 
In the third step, electoral success is regressed on policy choices made during the election 
year since both types of agency models in section 2, has the implication that rational 
voters should use a retrospective voting scheme, that is, to condition on current policy 
and to use Bayes rule to update their beliefs about politicians type or effort. Although, 
policies are endogenous to the chances of being re-elected, there is still some potentially 
valuable  information  to  be  gained  by  regressing  re-election  chances  on  policy.  For 
example, we can test whether spending is positively correlated with electoral success 
while holding taxes fixed. This test provides information of how voters’ value increases 
in spending in election years controlling for taxes. Hence, this is also a test whether an 
increase in spending during election years can be interpreted as a signal of competence 
(as in Rogoff’s model) or as a diversion of resources toward private ends (as in Besley 
and Case/Banks and Sundaram’s model).  
The  following  linear  probability  model  will  be  used  to  model  the  re-election 
decision of a local government i during an election year t:  
(4)   Rit = ci+ lt+ DPitw + DXit
￿
 + hit   
where ci is a municipality effect, lt a year effect, Xit are control variables, and DPit is the 
growth rate during the election year in the fiscal policy variables.  
                                                 
15 Here I have arbitrary chosen Dit as the reference category   11
4. Data 
The  full  sample  consists  of  288  municipalities  between  1974  and  1998.  During  this 
period there have been eight elections: 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, and 
1998. In the sample, 2259 observations correspond to election years; 1728 governments 
were re-elected and 531 were not re-appointed. Table 4 provides more disaggregated 
information  about  the  number  of  re-elected  and  not  re-appointed  governments  each 
election year.  
The classification of changes in power is compiled from the distribution of seats 
in local councils, which, due to the PR system, is basically equivalent to vote shares. 
Incumbent  governments  are  classified  as  left-wing,  right-wing  or  undefined.
16  A 
government change is defined as a change of power between left-wing, right-wing or 
undefined governments. This classification of regime changes is quite reasonable in the 
Swedish context since two main opposing blocs characterize the political map:
 the left- 
and right-wing blocs.
 17 Moreover, voter approval of incumbent governments is the focus 
in testing the rational electoral-cycle model, so it seems natural to define a change of 
power when the incumbent party bloc has lost its majority of votes. Table 5 shows the 
frequency  of  government  changes  for  the  municipalities.  The  number  of  government 
changes is very unequally dispersed among the different municipalities. For example, 117 
municipalities (40 percent of the sample) had no change of power. They had an average 
vote share of 63 percent. Here it is important to point out that in the tests of the political 
agency models in step 2, those municipalities with no government turnover will not be 
part  of  identifying  the  electoral  cycles  in  policy  since  only  the  within  municipality 
variation will be used. 
                                                 
16 The classification is taken from the official newspaper (i.e., www.kommunaktuellt.com) of the Swedish 
Association of Local Authorities. Left wing governments include both the Leftist Party and the Social 
Democratic Party. Right-wing governments include three parties or more: the Conservative Party, the 
Centrist party, the Liberal Party, the Christian Democratic Party (since1988), and the New Democratic 
Party (1991 to 1994). An undefined government is when neither the left wing nor the right-wing parties 
constitute a majority (50 percent of the seats) and it is often associated with strong local parties.  
17 Pettersson-Lidbom (2003) presents results that support the view that the Swedish party system can be 
treated “as if” it is a two-party system at the local level. Moreover, Alesina et al. (1997) also classify 
Sweden as a bipartisan system (along with U.S. and other political system with a clear left-right division) in 
their empirical analysis.    12
The rational electoral-cycle model implies that government spending and taxes 
are informative about the competence of governments or the amount of rent-seeking. I 
will therefore use total municipality spending and taxes as dependent variables. Since 
Swedish local governments only are allowed to raise their revenues through one tax: a 
proportional income tax,
 18 it is possible to use the tax rate itself as a dependent variable. 
In  comparison  to  the  total  tax  receipt  per  capita  used  by  many  other  electoral-cycle 
studies, the tax rate has the advantage of more closely reflecting of elected governments’ 
intentions. Spending is expressed in per capita terms, using 1991 prices, whereas the tax 
rate is expressed in percent.
19 Table 6 presents summary statistics for spending and the 
income tax rate in the sample period. It also presents summary statistics on the control 
variables:  proportion  of  people  of  age  0  to  15,  proportion  of  people  older  than  65, 
population size, population density, income,
20 and grants-in-aid and aggregate growth,. 
These set of controls are often used in the local public finance literature. For example, 
including controls for proportions of young and elderly are often rationalized by their link 
to  the  cost  and  benefits  of  local  government  spending,  while  population  size  and 
population density are included because they capture the possibility of congestion effects 
or scale economies in the provision of local government services. Income and grants-in 
aid are related to the fiscal capacities of municipalities, which may have independent 
effects on fiscal choices. Finally, I control for common shocks to the macroeconomy by 
including the percentage change in real GDP.
21 
All the data used are publicly available and were obtained from Statistics Sweden 
(SCB) or its publications.
22 
 
                                                 
18 Local governments have the constitutional right to set their own proportional income tax. On average, 
more than 55 percent of their revenues come from the income tax. 
19 I have used the implicit GDP deflator. The deflator is constructed by taking the ratio of GDP at current 
market prices to GDP at fixed market prices. 
20 Due to centralization of tax collection, the tax receipts to the local governments in year t are based on the 
taxable personal income in year t-2. In the empirical analysis, I have tried to deal with this feature by 
including both the municipality income in year t and t-2 as covariates. 
21 I have also conditioned on the aggregate unemployment rate and the employment rate, and this does not 
change the results presented below. 
22  The  publications  used  are:  How  much  do  local  public  services  cost  in  Sweden,  Local  government 
finance, and Statistical yearbook of administrative districts of Sweden.    13
5. Results 
In this section, I present the basic results from the tests of the rational electoral-cycle 
hypothesis. The presentation of the results will be divided into three subsections each 
corresponding to one of the steps in the empirical methodology, as explained in section 3. 
The first step is to test for election effects in policy (i.e., equations 1 and 2), while the 
second step tests the predictions from the political agency models (i.e., equation 3) and in 
the third step we regress electoral success on policy (i.e., equation 4).  
5.1 Basic Results 
Step 1 
The results from the test of an electoral cycle in fiscal policy are presented in Tables 7 
and 8. The first column in each table shows the results using the fixed-effect estimator 
(FE) with a lagged dependent variable, the second column shows the results from the 
instrumental  variable  estimator  proposed  by  Anderson-Hsiao  (AH),  the  third  column, 
present the results from the first-difference (FD) specification without a lagged dependent 
variable (i.e., equation 2), and column four shows the results from the FD model with 
municipality specific effects. A full set of control variables and election-period specific 
effects are included in all specifications. The results in these tables are striking. Spending 
is increased and taxes are decreased during election year as compared to off-election 
years for all specifications. These results are highly statistically significant. The effect on 
spending is sizable; spending is raised with about 700 to 900 SEK per capita,
 23 which is 
roughly  3  percent  of  average  spending  (mean=29,174)  or  equivalently  more  than  1 
percent of average income (mean=74,934). The size of the effect on the income tax rate is 
more modest, taxes are lowered in the order of 0.03 to 0.16 percentage points, which is 
about 0.5 percent of the average proportional income tax rate (mean=16.21). Another 
observation  one  can  make  from  these  tables  is  that  the  results  are  not  particularly 
sensitive of how one models dynamics, that is, via a lagged dependent variable or through 
the error term. 
                                                 
23 SEK 900 per capita is roughly equivalent to $ 150 per capita (i.e., SEK 6 » $ 1 in 1991 prices)   14
Step 2 
The results from the tests of the political agency models is revealed in Tables 9 and 10, 
As  was  discussed  in  section  2,  three  tests  will  be  performed  (see  Tables  1-3  for 
information about these tests):  The first test, PRE-ELECTION, is a test of whether the 
fiscal choices of politicians in the election year differ depending on whether they will be 
re-elected or not in the upcoming election. The second test, POST-ELECTION, is a test 
for  whether  the  policy  choices  of  policymakers  in  their  post-election  year  differ 
depending on whether they have been re-elected or are newly elected. The third test, 
PREPOST-ELECTION, is testing whether the post-election year fiscal behavior of re-
elected politicians should differ from their election year behavior. Tables 9 and 10 show 
the results from these tests for spending and taxes, respectively. All specification includes 
election-period specific effects, while the specification in columns (3) and (4) controls for 
municipality-specific  effects.  In  columns  (2)  and  (4),  a  full  set  of  controls  is  also 
included.  
  Table 9 reveals that for spending the PRE-ELECTION and POST-ELECTION 
tests are positive, while the PREPOST-ELECTION test is negative. All the estimates 
except one in the table are statistically significant. These results support the implication 
from Rogoff’s model where high spending is a signal of competence. The sizes of these 
effects are of similar magnitude to the election effect in the previous subsection, that is 
the order of, 1-3 percent of average spending (mean= 29,174). For example, the PRE-
ELECTION  test  shows  that  for  governments  that  will  be  re-elected  in  the  upcoming 
election increase spending with 400 to 1000 SEK per capita as compared to those which 
will not be re-appointed. 
  Table  10  shows  the  results  of  the  tests  for  taxes.  The  results  from  the  PRE-
ELECTION test is mixed; it is insignificant in columns 1 and 3 but significantly positive 
columns  2  and  4  when  control  variables are  added to  the  specifications.  The  POST-
ELECTION  test  is  negative  and  significant,  while  the  PREPOST-ELECTION  test  is 
positive and significant. Hence, these two latter tests support the predictions from the 
agency model, whereas the PRE-ELECTION test is basically inconclusive. These results 
provide further support for the agency models.   15
Step 3 
Table 11 present the results from a regressing electoral success, measured as a binary 
variable (i.e., re-elected=1, zero otherwise), on the growth of spending and taxes during 
the  election  year.  Time  and  municipality  fixed-effects  are  always  included  in  the 
regressions. In column 2, a full set of controls is also added to the specification. This 
table reveals that spending growth is correlated with re-election chances, while taxes are 
not. The insignificant result on taxes is consistent with results for the PRE-ELECTION 
test  in  Table  10,  namely  that  there  is  basically  no  difference  in  taxes  between 
governments that will be re-election as compared to those that will not be re-appointed in 
the next election. The positive correlation between spending growth and electoral success 
conditional on taxes gives further support to that increases in spending during election 
year is a signal of competence and not the result from excessive rent extraction. 
5.2 Robustness checks 
So far I have made the implicit assumption that parties do not matter for fiscal policy 
choices. However, this statement is not true as shown by Pettersson-Lidbom (2003) using 
a regression-discontinuity  analysis on the same data set.  In that paper, I find strong 
evidence that left-wing parties spend and tax more than right-wing parties. Hence, this 
party effect may be confounded with the electoral-cycle effects in fiscal policies. To test 
whether this is the case, all the results from the three-step methodology steps is remade 
by  including  the  same  variables  as  in  Pettersson-Lidbom’s  regression-discontinuity 
analysis, namely indicators for left- and right-wing governments and together with vote 
shares. These results are presented in Tables 12-14 and they reveal that all the previous 
results are unchanged. 
   16
6. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper develops a three-step empirical approach to assess the empirical relevance of 
the rational electoral-cycle hypothesis using an attractive data set from Swedish local 
governments with more than 2000 observation from elections. The results are striking. In 
election years, spending is increased and taxes decreased. Moreover, governments that 
are about to get re-elected raise spending as compared to governments about those that 
will be replaced in the upcoming election. Furthermore, in the post election year, re-
elected  governments  have  higher  spending  and  lower  taxes  than  newly  elected  ones. 
Another finding is that re-elected governments have lower spending and higher taxes in 
the  post-election  than  in  the  election  year.  Finally,  electoral  success  is  positively 
correlated with spending holding taxes fixed. These results provide strong support to 
Rogoff’s  model  where  government  signals  their  competence  trough  cycles  in  fiscal 
policy. 
   17
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Table 1. Definition of indicator variables 
 
  
A  =1 if election year and the government will be re-elected in the upcoming election 
  =0 otherwise 
B  =1 if election year and the government will be replaced in the upcoming election 
  =0 otherwise 
C  =1 if post-election year and the government is re-elected in the election 
  =0 otherwise 
D  =1 if post-election year and the government is newly elected 
  =0 otherwise 
 
 
Table 2. Definition of the tests of the agency models 
 
 
PRE-ELECTION  E[Policy| A=1]- E[Policy| B=1] 
POST-ELECTION  E[Policy| C=1]- E[Policy| D=1] 
PREPOST-ELECTION  E[Policy| C=1]- E[Policy| A=1] 
 
 
Table 3. Predictions about fiscal policy from the agency models 
 
TESTS  Spending  Taxes 
  Rogoff 
PRE-ELECTION  Positive  Negative 
POST-ELECTION  Positive  Negative 
PREPOST-ELECTION  Negative  Positive 
   Besley and Case/Banks and Sundaram 
PRE-ELECTION   Negative  Negative 
POST-ELECTION  Negative  Negative 
PREPOST-ELECTION  Positive  Positive   20
 
 




Re-elected  Not re-elected 
1976  233  44 
1979  237  40 
1982  229  50 
1985  244  40 
1988  237  47 
1991  179  105 
1994  144  142 
1998  225  63 
Total sum 1976-1998  1728  531 
Note. - A non re-elected government is defined as a change of power between left wing, right wing or 






Table 5. Frequency of government turnovers 
 
Frequency of government turnovers 
 
Number of municipalities 
0  117 
1  26 
2  43 
3  39 
4  32 
5  16 
6  11 
7  4 
8  0 
Note. - A government turnover is defined as a change of power between left wing, right wing or undefined 
governments.  
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics for the dependent and control variables 
 
Variables  Mean  Standard d.  Min  Max 
Total spending  29,174  6,015  14,392  70,032 
Income tax rate 
(%) 
16.21  1.82  9.7  32.25 
Aggregate 













21.05  2.69  12.65  36.69 
Proportion of 
old, 65+ 
17.79  4.22  3.27  28.14 
Income   74,934  13,302  15,944  174,473 
Population size  29,923  53,074  2,865  727,339 
Population 
density 
115  373  0.28  3,884 
Grants  2,589  2,598  -4,749  19,599 
Spending, income and grants are expressed in per capita terms and in 1991 prices.   22
Table 7. Electoral cycles in spending 
 
  1  2  3  4 












Yes  Yes  No  No 
Election-period 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed effects  -  -  No  Yes 
Number of 
observations 
6750  6150  6750  6750 
Notes- Standard errors within parentheses; In columns 1 and 2, Huber-White robust standard errors are 
used to compute standard errors, while in columns 3 and 4, Huber-White Standard errors allowing for 
clustering  at  the  municipality  level  to  account  for  possible  serial  correlation  in  the  errors  within 
municipalities are used compute standard errors: * significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
10%. In columns 1 and 2, the following regression is run Spendingit = mi + dELEit + gSpendingi,t-1 + Xitq + 
eit. In column 1, a fixed effect estimator is used, whereas in column 2 the instrumental variable estimator 
proposed by Anderson and Hsiao is used with SpendingPi,t-2 as instrument for SpendingPi,t-1. The following 
control variables is being used: aggregate growth, proportion of people of age 0 to 15, proportion of people 




Table 8. Electoral cycles in taxes 
 
  1  2  3   4 












Yes  Yes  No  No 
Election-period 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed effects  -  -  No  Yes 
Number of 
observations 
6777  6201  6777  6777 
Notes- Standard errors within parentheses; In columns 1 and 2, Huber-White robust standard errors are 
used to compute standard errors, while in columns 3 and 4, Huber-White Standard errors allowing for 
clustering  at  the  municipality  level  to  account  for  possible  serial  correlation  in  the  errors  within 
municipalities are used compute standard errors: * significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
10%. In columns 1 and 2, the following regression is run Taxesit = mi + dELEit + gTaxesi,t-1 + Xitq + eit. In 
column  1,  a  fixed  effect  estimator  is  used,  whereas  in  column  2  the  instrumental  variable  estimator 
proposed by Anderson and Hsiao is used with DTaxesi,t-2 as instrument for DTaxesi,t-1. The following control 
variables is being used: aggregate growth, proportion of people of age 0 to 15, proportion of people older 
than 65, population size, population density, income, income (t-2), and grants-in-aid 
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Table 9. Political agency: spending 
  
  Dependent variable: DSpending 
 
  1  2  3  4 
























Election-period effects  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls  No 
 
Yes  No  Yes 
Fixed effects  No 
 
No  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  4217  4217  4217  4217 
Notes-  Standard  errors  within  parentheses;  Huber-White Standard  errors  allowing  for  clustering  at the 
municipality level to account for possible serial correlations in the errors within municipalities are used 
compute standard errors: * significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%. In column 1 the 
following regression is run: DSpendingit =a0 +a1Ait + a2Bit + a3Cit + uit and set of controls DXit are added 
to the specification column 2. In column 3 the following regression is run: DSpendingit =mi + a0 +a1Ait + 
a2Bit + a3Cit + uit and a set of controls DXit are added to the specification in column 4. The following 
control variables is being used: aggregate growth, proportion of people of age 0 to 15, proportion of people 
older than 65, population size, population density, income, income (t-2), and grants-in-aid 
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Table 10.  Political agency: taxes 
 
  Dependent variable: Dtaxes 
 
  1  2  3  4 
























Election-period effects  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls  No 
 
Yes  No  Yes 
Fixed effects  No 
 
No  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  4230  4230  4230  4230 
Notes-  Standard  errors  within  parentheses;  Huber-White Standard  errors  allowing  for  clustering  at the 
municipality level to account for possible serial correlations in the errors within municipalities are used 
compute standard errors: * significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%. In column 1 the 
following regression is run: DTaxesit =a0 +a1Ait + a2Bit + a3Cit + uit and set of controls DXit are added to 
the specification column 2. In column 3 the following regression is run: DTaxesit =mi + a0 +a1Ait + a2Bit + 
a3Cit + uit and a set of controls DXit are added to the specification in column 4. The following control 
variables is being used: aggregate growth, proportion of people of age 0 to 15, proportion of people older 
than 65, population size, population density, income, income (t-2), and grants-in-aid   25
Table 11.  Effects on policy on re-election chance s 
 
  Dependent variable: Indicator for re-election 
 
  1  2 








Time effects  Yes  Yes 
 
Fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
 
Controls  No  Yes 
 
Number of observations  2258  2258 
Notes- Standard errors within parentheses; Huber-White Standard errors allowing for clustering at the 
municipality level to account for possible serial correlations in the errors within municipalities are used 
compute standard errors: * significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.. The following 
control variables is being used: aggregate growth, proportion of people of age 0 to 15, proportion of people 
older than 65, population size, population density, income, income (t-2), and grants-in-aid 
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Table 12. Step 1 with party controls 
 























See the notes from Tables 7 and 8. 
 
Table 13. Step 2 with party controls 
  
  1  2  3  4 
Dependent variable: DSpending 
























Dependent variable: DTaxes 
























See the notes from Tables 9 and 10. 
 
Table 14. Step 3 with party controls 
 
  Dependent variable: Indicator for re-election 
 
  1  2 








See the notes from Table 11. 